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Abstract This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the historic fossil fuel and cement
production records of the 50 leading investor-owned, 31 state-owned, and 9 nation-state
producers of oil, natural gas, coal, and cement from as early as 1854 to 2010. This analysis
traces emissions totaling 914 GtCO2e—63 % of cumulative worldwide emissions of industrial
CO2 and methane between 1751 and 2010—to the 90 “carbon major” entities based on the
carbon content of marketed hydrocarbon fuels (subtracting for non-energy uses), process CO2
from cement manufacture, CO2 from flaring, venting, and own fuel use, and fugitive or vented
methane. Cumulatively, emissions of 315 GtCO2e have been traced to investor-owned entities,
288 GtCO2e to state-owned enterprises, and 312 GtCO2e to nation-states. Of these emissions,
half has been emitted since 1986. The carbon major entities possess fossil fuel reserves that
will, if produced and emitted, intensify anthropogenic climate change. The purpose of the
analysis is to understand the historic emissions as a factual matter, and to invite consideration
of their possible relevance to public policy.
1 Introduction
It is now broadly accepted that anthropogenic climate change presents a serious threat to the
health, prosperity, and stability of human communities, and to the stability and existence of
non-human species and ecosystems (IPCC 2007; World Bank 2012b; Hoeppe 2011; Busby
2007). The international legal framework established in 1992 to prevent “dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference”with the climate system has focused attention on the role of nation-states,
and has led to commitments by many nation-states (particularly the Annex I or highly
developed nations) to cut their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, current climate
change is primarily driven by historic emissions (Allen et al. 2009b; Matthews et al. 2009; Wei
et al. 2012; IPCC 2013), and the parties responsible for the dominant sources of historic
emissions are not necessarily the same as those responsible for the dominant share of current
emissions. This paper provides an original quantitative analysis of historic emissions by
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tracing sources of industrial CO2 and methane to the 90 largest corporate investor-owned and
state-owned producers of fossil fuels and cement from as early as 1854 to 2010. The purpose
of this analysis is to understand those historic emissions as a factual matter, to invite
consideration of their possible relevance to public policy, and to lay the possible groundwork
for apportioning responsibility for climate change to the entities that provided the hydrocarbon
products to the global economy.
2 International policy and historic emissions
Cumulative historic emissions have caused persistently higher atmospheric concentration of
carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions (Matthews et al. 2009; Zickfeld et al. 2010). While
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 can be lowered in several ways, it is generally agreed that
to avoid further dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system, net future
emissions must be reduced from business-as-usual projections. Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992, “Framework Convention”)
agreed that developed nations “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities… should take the lead in combating climate change and the
adverse effects thereof.” By “differentiated” it was recognized that Annex I nations had
produced most of the GHG emissions, and therefore were responsible for taking the first steps
in reducing emissions. Numerous proposals on equitable distribution of burdens and remedies
for climate change have been made. These include equal per capita allocation over time (Baer
et al. 2000; Bode 2004), contraction and convergence toward a common per capita emission
rate at a predetermined year (Global Commons Institute 2008), common but differentiated
convergence with favorable allowances for non-Annex I countries (Höhne et al. 2006), multi-
criteria regimes that account for historic responsibility, capability to contribute, and needs,
such as poverty alleviation (Ringius et al. 2002), and remaining CO2 and methane “debt” from
historic emissions (Smith et al. 2013). Ignoring historic emissions that disadvantage poorer
nations violate the principle embodied in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment
that nation-states’ “sovereign right to exploit their own resources” is subject to not causing
“damage to the environment of other states.” (Neumayer 2000).
One of the proposals that account for historic emissions is the Brazilian Proposal, analyzed
by the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA) in the run-up
to Kyoto, which suggested that the burden of addressing climate change should be apportioned
on the basis of the temperature response from national historic CO2 emissions (den Elzen et al.
2005; Rive et al. 2006; Baumert and Kete 2002). Such equity-based proposals argue, in part,
that wealth is closely tied to historic energy use and therefore to historic emissions and
attributed radiative forcing, and it is appropriate to apportion greater responsibility for emis-
sions reductions to the nations that became wealthy in large part by consuming, and in many
cases producing, the carbon fuels for the world market (Gardiner 2004; Jamieson 2009).
Annex I countries rejected this argument on the grounds that they could not be held
responsible for emissions made prior to 1990, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) first warned that greenhouse gas emissions were contributing to global
warming. In essence, they argued that they could not be held responsible for a problem they
did not yet know existed. This argument ignores the many scientific warnings published in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (President’s Science Advisory Committee 1965; Matthews et al.
1971; Broecker 1975; World Meteorological Organization 1976; National Research Council
1979; U.S. EPA 1983; see discussion in Weart 2003; Fleming 2005; Oreskes and Conway
2010). In addition, many countries, including Brazil and the United States, have laws
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embracing the legal principle of “objective responsibility” by which a polluter cannot escape
responsibility by claiming ignorance of environmental damages (La Rovere et al. 2002;
Gardiner 2011).
3 A new approach: tracing emissions to producers
The question of wealth generated through the production and use of fossil fuels suggests an
alternative to the nation-state approach: to analyze emissions in terms of the fossil fuels
produced by incorporated entities—such as investor-owned or state-owned companies—rather
than states as consumers and emitters. This perspective calls attention to the fact that
substantial emissions have come from fossil fuels sourced from non-Annex I countries such
as China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Iran, Brazil, and Mexico, and from nations that
are not large scale emitters, such as Nigeria, Venezuela, Kuwait, Angola, Malaysia, and Libya.
The Framework Convention apportions responsibility to the wealthy Annex I nations that have
benefited most from using fossil fuels. However, considerable wealth has also accumulated to
nations and companies that produce the fuels sold on the international market. For this reason,
the present analysis focuses on the world’s largest investor-owned and state-owned carbon
producers, whether situated in Annex I or non-Annex I nations, and invites consideration of
the suggestion that some degree of responsibility for both cause and remedy for climate change
rests with those entities that have extracted, refined, and marketed the preponderance of the
historic carbon fuels.
4 Analysis and methods
For tractability, a threshold of ≥8 million tonnes carbon per year (MtC/y) for fossil fuel
production was established. This resulted in the identification of 90 entities: 50 of which are
investor-owned companies, 31 are state-owned enterprises, and 9 are current or former
centrally planned states. Of these 90 entities 56 are crude oil and natural gas producers, 37
are coal extractors (including subsidiaries of oil & gas companies), and 7 are cement
producers. Headquartered in 43 countries, these entities extract resources from every oil,
natural gas, and coal province in the world, and process the fuels into marketable products
that are sold to consumers in every nation on Earth.
Company production records were retrieved from publicly available annual reports from
university and public library collections in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia, from
company websites, company reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
company histories, and other sources. The carbon content of each entity’s annual production of
coal, oil and natural gas liquids, and natural gas was calculated using IPCC, United Nations,
International Energy Agency (IEA), and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) carbon
factors to quantify the annual emissions traceable to each entity. Historically complete records
were sought from the earliest records available (the earliest is from 1854) through 2010. Where
mergers or acquisitions occurred, carbon production and emissions prior to the date of
acquisition are attributed to the extant company.
Since the objective of the analysis is to estimate carbon entering the atmosphere, two
important calculations are made. The first is for non-combustion uses of hydrocarbon products.
For crude oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs), non-energy uses include petrochemicals,
lubricants, road oil, waxes, solvents, and other industrial uses; for natural gas they include
fertilizer production and pharmaceuticals; and for coal include pigments, carbon fibers, and
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steel making. These non-combustion uses effectively store carbon, and thus must be subtracted
from the emission calculations. The net storage rates were derived from 1980 to 2010 data on
non-energy uses in the United States following the IPCC inventory and carbon storage
protocols (Environmental Protection Agency 2012a, b; IPCC 2006). Short-term combustion
of petrochemical products such as plastics in waste-to-energy plants, synthetic tires burned in
cement kilns, recycled lubricating oils used as fuel (or oxidized in normal use), wax burning,
petroleum coke used in refineries, special naphthas volatilized in paints, and other uses are
credited back to the oxidation column in determining the final storage and emission rates for
each fuel type. The final net storage rates are 8.02 % for liquids, 1.86 % for natural gas, and
0.016 % for coal.
The analysis accounts for the carbon content of each fuel, and therefore the CO2 released on
combustion to the atmosphere. This is particularly important for coal, since producers report
physical quantities rather than heating values (i.e., tons, barrels, or cubic feet rather than energy
content). The carbon content factors for each fuel follow international guidelines. The carbon
content varies most for coal—from ~33 % carbon for lignites to ~72 % carbon for
anthracites—and the rank of produced coal is noted when reported. In many cases producers
provided scant guidance on heating values or rank of coal mined, instead using generic labels
such as “thermal coal” or “metallurgical coal,” in which cases the average IPCC values for
these fuels have been applied. (See Supplementary Materials).
Additional emission sources attributable to oil, gas, and coal operations include CO2 vented
from processing of raw (sour) natural gas, CO2 from gas flaring (typical at oil production sites
where gas is stranded), and fugitive or vented methane from oil and gas operations and coal
mining. These emission rates were derived from IPCC Tier 1 factors and corroborated with
EPA data on CO2 and CH4 leakage, flaring, and venting rates (IPCC 2006; EPA 2012a, b),
flaring data from the World Bank (World Bank 2012a), and coal mine methane venting rates
using data from U.S. and international sources (EPA 2011, 2012b; Stern and Kaufmann 1998;
European Commission 2011). Operational emission rates vary across the global oil, gas, and
coal industries by country, company, field location, offshore vs. onshore, surface vs. under-
ground coal mining, and decade of production. In all cases, the factors applied to each
producing entity are within the ranges proscribed by credible international sources.
The emission factors, methodology, and results are compared to the Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center’s (CDIAC) database of global CO2 emissions from 1751 to the
present (Marland and Rotty 1984; Marland et al. 2011). Methane emission rates are compared
to the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre’s EDGAR database of global CH4
emissions by source from 1970 to 2008 (extrapolated to 2010; Stern & Kaufmann methane
data for 1860–1969). (See Supplementary Materials, and Heede 2013). A global warming
potential for methane of 21×CO2 (100-year time horizon) is used (IPCC 1996).
Seven cement manufacturers—six investor-owned companies in Japan, Switzerland,
France, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, plus China—contributed process emissions from the
calcining of limestone (CaCO3→CaO+CO2). Emissions of CO2 from energy inputs to kilns
and power plants are excluded. The data is for 1990 to 2010, except China (from 1928).
Calcining emissions are from industry data submitted to the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development’s Cement Sustainability Initiative (WBCSD 2011).
5 Conservatisms, caveats, and uncertainties
Production data and thus attributed emissions are generally conservative. Early production
records are not always available, emission factors are typically at or below international values,
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non-energy uses were far lower in the early decades than the applied sequestration factor of
8 % for petroleum products (thus emissions would have been commensurately higher), natural
gas production was often not reported by producers prior to 1930 (gas was a low-value fuel in
the early 20th century, and often flared or vented to the atmosphere); accidental spills, “upset
conditions,” and emissions from acts of sabotage or war have been excluded from this
analysis. CO2 emissions by the cement industry do not cover production prior to 1990 (except
for China). Consequently, this study underreports fossil fuel and cement production compared
to the actual history of production by nearly all of the carbon major entities. Unpublished
company records (if released) may fill in these reporting gaps in the future.
Potential sources of double-counting of oil and gas production have been minimized. Many
oil majors only reported gross rather than net or equity production in the 1950s to mid-1970s;
this analysis estimates net production by applying a net-to-gross ratio to those companies that
reported only gross production for selected years, based on each entity’s reporting of both net
and gross production in later years. Many state-owned oil companies report production in part
attributable to their international joint venture or production-sharing partners, or is otherwise
ambiguous or incomplete and often report total oil and gas production within the nation’s
territory or territorial waters. The details of production-sharing agreements, concessions, and
joint ventures are not publicly available, but each state-owned entity has been analyzed in
terms of dates of nationalization, equity buy-outs or asset seizures, and fractional shares of
national production to the extent this is publicly available (Victor et al. 2012; Marcel 2006;
World Bank 2008). Complete reporting by both investor-owned and state-owned companies
on equity or working interest production will remove any remaining inaccuracies. (See
Supplementary Materials and Heede 2013).
Attributed methane emissions are conservative relative to global coal industry methane
emissions (38 % of coal-related methane versus 51 % of global coal production). IPCC default
methane emission rates (which are 16 times higher for underground mining than for opencast)
are applied to all carbon major coal entities; this factor is scaled to the proportion of production
by mining method (60 % underground, and 40 % opencast) (IPCC 2006; World Coal
Association 2005). However, coal operators often do not specify opencast or underground
production, and carbon major entities may be attributed methane emissions that are substan-
tially lower than their actual emissions, or vice-versa. In addition, operators differ on direct
venting versus flaring or utilizing the methane, and company reporting on methane generation,
venting, and disposition is generally poor.
Factors for non-energy uses and direct emission of CO2 from flaring and venting and
fugitive methane are based on international standards and data (IPCC 2006; U.S. EPA 2012b;
European Commission 2011; United Nations 2012; see Heede 2013). These are applied to
each entity, for each fuel, and for each year, but the operations of individual companies often
vary from international norms. Attributed methane, vented CO2, and flaring emissions are
conservative relative to international data on emission rates (IPCC 2006; Marland et al. 2011;
European Commission 2011).
This study includes energy consumption and emissions from the oil and gas industry’s use
of its own fuels at a rate of 5.9 % of natural gas production, less than the 9.5 to 10 % of
combined oil and natural gas production estimated for the oil and gas supply chain by the
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA 2011).
Uncertainty ranges are difficult to estimate given the variety of producing entities,
reporting quality and completeness, and the additional emission sources applied to entities
with differing operating characteristics. Overall, however, the total emissions attributed to
the fossil fuel producers in this study are in close agreement with CDIAC estimates in
proportion to fuel production data for 1980–2010 (−2.3 % for crude oil & NGLs, +1.0 %
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for natural gas, and +3.3 % for coal). The uncertainties are mainly a result of incomplete or
unclear reporting by the fossil fuel and cement producers.
6 Results: “carbon majors”
A total of 914 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent (GtCO2e) has been traced to 90 international
entities based on analysis of historic production records dating from 1854 to 2010. These
entities cumulatively produced 985 billion barrels (bbl) of crude oil and NGLs (79 billion bbl
were used for non-energy products), 2,248 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), and 163 billion tonnes of
various ranks of coal. The emissions traced to the carbon majors represent 63 % of global
industrial CO2 and methane from fossil fuel combustion, flaring, venting, fugitive or vented
methane, own fuel use, and cement between 1751 and 2010 (Fig. 1; Table 1). The top source is
366 GtCO2 from the combustion of oil products from 55 entities representing 77.5 % of the
global CDIAC estimate of oil emissions (Tables 1 and 2; Marland et al. 2011).
Of total industrial CO2 and CH4 emissions from 1751 to 2010, one-half has been emitted
since 1984 (Marland et al. 2011). Of the emissions traced to carbon major fossil fuel and
cement production, half has been emitted since 1986 (Fig. 1). Cumulatively, emissions of 315
GtCO2e have been traced to investor-owned entities, 288 GtCO2e to state-owned companies,
and 312 GtCO2e to nation-states (Fig. 2). The dip in relative production by nation-states in the
late 1980s through early 2000s is due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of
new state-owned oil and natural gas entities in Russia as well as the transformation of China’s
petroleum sector into state-owned entities.
Cumulative emissions attributed to the twenty largest investor-owned and state-owned
energy companies between 1854 and 2010 total 428 GtCO2e, or 29.5 % of global industrial
emissions from 1751 to 2010 (Table 3). The ten largest investor-owned companies alone
contributed 230 GtCO2e, or 15.8 % of global emissions through 2010. (See Supplementary
Materials for results on all 90 entities.)
Fig. 1 Global and Carbon Major entities’ CO2 emissions, 1850–2010. Global industrial emissions of CO2 from
CDIAC plus methane from Stern & Kaufmann & European Commission (black line). Results of all Carbon
Major entities’ emissions of CO2 and methane (red line)
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7 Discussion
Parties to the Framework Convention agreed in 1992 that Annex I nations would
shoulder most of the burden of funding international negotiations, paying adaptation
costs for the poorest nations, and taking the lead in combating climate change, on the
basis of the argument that they had benefitted the most from being the largest
historical emitters, and therefore had the greatest responsibility for addressing it. This
regime has so far failed to reduce global GHG emissions (Olivier et al. 2012; Peters
et al. 2012; IEA 2012a; Victor 2009; Höhne et al. 2011), and some observers have
concluded that the process is at an impasse (Victor 2011; Schiermeier 2012; Rogelj
et al. 2010).
While not disputing the logic of the UNFCCC, the analysis presented here suggests a
somewhat different, and perhaps useful, way to consider responsibility for climate change. The
analysis highlights the fact that major producers of fossil fuels are not all located in Annex I
Table 1 Industrial CO2 and CH4
emissions: comparing this study
to CDIAC data 1751–2010
Global CO2 combustion data is
from CDIAC; methane is from








Source GtCO2e GtCO2e % of global
Oil & NGLs 365.7 472.0 77.5 %
Natural gas 120.1 176.1 68.2 %
Coal 329.6 642.5 51.3 %
Flaring 6.0 12.6 47.9 %
Cement 13.2 32.5 40.6 %
VentedCO2 4.8 na na
Own fuel use 7.1 na na
Fugitive methane 67.6 114.6 59.0 %
Sum 914.3 1,450.3 63.0 %
Table 2 Carbon majors cumulative








Oil & NGLs 55 365.73 40.00 %
Natural gas 56 120.11 13.14 %
Coal 36 329.60 36.05 %
Flaring 56 6.04 0.66 %
Own fuel use 56 7.12 0.78 %
Cement 7 13.21 1.45 %
Vented CO2 54 4.83 0.53 %
Fugitive methane 83 67.62 7.40 %
Total 90 914.25 100.0 %
CDIAC global emissions 1751–2010 1,450.33
Carbon Majors of global emissions 63.04 %
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nations: Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, India, Venezuela, Mexico, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi,
and Algeria appear on the list of top twenty producers (Table 3). Of the 85 extant
entities, 54 are headquartered in Annex I countries, and 31 in non-Annex I nations.
Considerable benefits have accrued to these carbon majors, and to their state-sponsors
and investors. Given this, it seems reasonable to argue that they have an ethical
obligation to help address climate destabilization (Gardiner et al. 2010; Gardiner
2011). Moreover, many of these entities—both state- and investor-owned—possess the
financial resources and technical capabilities to develop and contribute to climate change
mitigation and adaptation.
The full menu or analysis of mitigation, adaptation, and climate amelioration options
available to the global carbon industry is beyond the scope of this paper. A partial list includes
developing carbon capture and storage capacity (Allen et al. 2009a), funding adaptation
programs (such as the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund), investing in or developing technologies
and programs to realize the enormous global potential for efficient use of carbon fuels (Lovins
2011), developing low- or zero-carbon alternative fuels and power generation systems, funding
geo-engineering research, publicly committing to capture and store or remove carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere commensurate with their historic emissions, supporting
international climate diplomacy and domestic climate legislation (as leading multina-
tional oil and gas companies have begun to do), and, in the event liability for historic
and/or future emissions is not averted, setting aside financial reserves to cover potential
climate liability claims. Greater transparency, including comprehensive reporting of all
direct and product-related emissions, and full disclosure to investors of potential
liabilities stemming from company operations or products, material risks to company
assets, or material threats to future profits from climate change is warranted (Hancock
2005; Coburn et al. 2011).
Focusing, for a moment, on the possibility of future efforts to capture and store carbon, note
that most of the entities highlighted in this analysis have the technical and institutional
capabilities necessary to lead research and development in carbon capture and storage or to
Fig. 2 Carbon Majors’ emissions by ownership category, 1910–2010. The total historic contributions of each
ownership category are nearly equal: 34.4 % investor-owned (red), 34.1 % nation-states (green), and 31.5 %
state-owned (blue), but the proportions vary over time
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participate in other proactive climate mitigation programs. This analysis could provide a basis
for calculating the amounts of carbon that would have to be captured and stored by various
entities to compensate for their contributions to climate change to date, thus providing a factual
basis for thinking through what a fair proposal might look like.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the extant carbon major entities discussed in this paper
possess proven recoverable carbon reserves that will, if produced and emitted, intensify
anthropogenic climate change and greatly exacerbate the social, political, and economic
challenges related to it (Carbon Tracker 2011). Analysis based on historic emissions can also
be applied to each entity’s own carbon reserves and shares of its future carbon production that
would need to be captured and stored (or offset by other means) in increasing percentages per
annum (Allen et al. 2009a).
Indeed, the entities identified in this analysis hold two important assets—production
capacity and proven recoverable reserves—that, together with profit motives and tax and
regulatory incentives to discover and produce new fossil fuel reserves, hold the key to future
Table 3 Top twenty investor- &
state-owned entities and attributed
CO2 & CH4 emissions
Right column compares each
entity’s cumulative emissions to
CDIAC’s global emissions 1751–
2010. Excludes British Coal,
whose production and assets have
not been attributed to extant
companies, and five of nine
nation-states (FSU, China,
Poland, Russian Federation, and







Entity MtCO2e MtCO2e 1751–2010
1. Chevron, USA 423 51,096 3.52 %
2. ExxonMobil, USA 655 46,672 3.22 %
3. Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia 1,550 46,033 3.17 %
4. BP, UK 554 35,837 2.47 %
5. Gazprom, Russian Federation 1,371 32,136 2.22 %
6. Royal Dutch/Shell,
Netherlands
478 30,751 2.12 %
7. National Iranian Oil Company 867 29,084 2.01 %
8. Pemex, Mexico 602 20,025 1.38 %
9. ConocoPhillips, USA 359 16,866 1.16 %
10. Petroleos de Venezuela 485 16,157 1.11 %
11. Coal India 830 15,493 1.07 %
12. Peabody Energy, USA 519 12,432 0.86 %
13. Total, France 398 11,911 0.82 %
14. PetroChina, China 614 10,564 0.73 %
15. Kuwait Petroleum Corp. 323 10,503 0.73 %
16. Abu Dhabi NOC, UAE 387 9,672 0.67 %
17. Sonatrach, Algeria 386 9,263 0.64 %
18. Consol Energy, Inc., USA 160 9,096 0.63 %
19. BHP-Billiton, Australia 320 7,606 0.52 %
20. Anglo American, United
Kingdom
242 7,242 0.50 %
Top 20 IOCs & SOEs 11,523 428,439 29.54 %
Top 40 IOCs & SOEs 546,767 37.70 %
All 81 IOCs & SOEs 18,524 602,491 41.54 %
Total 90 carbon majors 27,946 914,251 63.04 %
Total global emissions 36,026 1,450,332 100.00 %
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fossil fuel production and emissions (Allen et al. 2009b), and thus, arguably, the future of the
planetary climate system. The International Energy Agency has concluded that “no more than
one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior to 2050 if the world is to
achieve the 2 °C goal” (IEA 2012b); most of these reserves are in the hands of carbon majors.
Redoubling international efforts to secure an effective climate agreement will likely prove
insufficient unless some means can be found to involve the carbon majors in the effort to keep
their reserves in the ground or commensurate efforts to prevent or offset their emission to
the atmosphere.
8 Conclusion
The analysis presented here focuses attention on the commercial and state-owned entities
responsible for producing the fossil fuels and cement that are the primary sources of anthro-
pogenic greenhouse gases that are driving and will continue to drive climate change. The
results show that nearly two-thirds of historic carbon dioxide and methane emissions can be
attributed to 90 entities.
This analysis offers a somewhat different perspective on the causes of and respon-
sibility for dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system. Without mini-
mizing the responsibility of Annex I nations, nor of China and India, often discussed,
this analysis highlights the role of some non-Annex I nations, such Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, Mexico, Iran, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia, Brazil, and
other countries that have not been at the center of discussions regarding responsibility
for controlling emissions. Some of these nations are, in their role as carbon producers,
as important contributors to climate change as the Annex I nations who until now have
been the focus of attention.
Most analyses to date, as well as the UNFCCC structure, consider responsibility for
climate change in terms of nation-states. Such analyses fit the framework of interna-
tional law, insofar as treaties and conventions are based on agreements between nation-
states. However, responsibility can be understood in other ways as well, as done in the
present analysis tracing emissions to major carbon producers. Shifting the perspective
from nation-states to corporate entities—both investor-owned and state-owned
companies—opens new opportunities for those entities to become part of the solution
rather than passive (and profitable) bystanders to continued climate disruption. Future
work (Heede and Oreskes, in prep.) will examine the question of ethical, political, and
legal arguments to enlist or require these carbon majors in limiting further dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Social pressures may be brought to
bear on investor-owned entities, which could work as an additional lever to push action
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or removing CO2 from the atmosphere. Regulation,
litigation, and shareholder actions targeted at the private entities responsible for
tobacco-related diseases played a significant role in the history of tobacco control;
one could imagine comparable actions aimed at the private entities involved in the
production of fossil fuels, particularly insofar as some of the entities included in this
analysis have played a role in efforts to impede legislation that might slow the
production and sale of carbon fuels. Energy companies have strong financial incentives
to produce and market their booked reserves and oppose efforts to leave their valuable
assets in the ground (Grantham 2012), but social and legal pressures may shift these incentives.
Identifying who the major carbon producers are, and have been historically, may provide a
useful basis for future social and legal pressure.
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